The notion of aggregate signature has been motivated by applications and it enables any user to compress different signatures signed by different signers on different messages into a short signature. Sequential aggregate signature, in turn, is a special kind of aggregate signature that only allows a signer to add his signature into an aggregate signature in sequential order. This latter scheme has applications in diversified settings such as in reducing bandwidth of certificate chains and in secure routing protocols. Lu, Ostrovsky, Sahai, Shacham, and Waters (EUROCRYPT 2006) presented the first sequential aggregate signature scheme in the standard model. The size of their public key, however, is quite large (i.e., the number of group elements is proportional to the security parameter), and therefore, they suggested as an open problem the construction of such a scheme with short keys.
Introduction
Aggregate signature is a relatively new type of public-key signature (PKS) that enables any user to combine n signatures signed by n different signers on n different messages into a short signature. The concept of public-key aggregate signature (PKAS) was introduced by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham [10] , and they proposed an efficient PKAS scheme in the random oracle model using bilinear groups. After that, numerous PKAS schemes were proposed using bilinear groups [1, 7, 8, 15, 16, 27, 28] or using trapdoor permutations [3, 29, 31] .
One application of aggregate signature is the certificate chains of the public-key infrastructure (PKI) [10] . The PKI system has a tree structure, and a certificate for a user consists of a certificate chain from a root node to a leaf node, each node in the chain signing its predecessor. If the signatures in the certificate chain are replaced with a single aggregate signature, then bandwidth for signature transfer can be significantly saved. Another application is to the secure routing protocol of the Internet protocol [10] . If each router that participates in the routing protocol uses a PKAS scheme instead of a PKS scheme, then the communication overload of signature transfer can be dramatically reduced. Furthermore, aggregate signatures have other applications such as reducing bandwidth in sensor networks or ad-hoc networks, as well as in software authentication in the presence of software update [1] .
Previous Methods
Aggregate signature schemes are categorized as full aggregate signature, synchronized aggregate signature, and sequential aggregate signature depending on the type of signature aggregation. They have also been applied to regular signatures in the PKI model and to ID-based signatures (with a trusted key server).
The first type of aggregate signature is full aggregate signature, which enables any user to freely aggregate different signatures of different signers. This full aggregate signature is the most flexible aggregate signature since it does not require any restriction on the aggregation step (though restriction may be needed at times for certain applications). However, there is only one full aggregate signature scheme, proposed by Boneh et al. [10] 1 . Since this scheme is based on the short signature scheme of Boneh et al. [11] , the signature length it provides is also very short. However, the security of the scheme has just been proven in the idealized random oracle model and the number of pairing operations in the aggregate signature verification algorithm is proportional to the number of signers in the aggregate signature.
The second type of aggregate signature is synchronized aggregate signature, which enables any user to combine different signatures with the same synchronizing information into a single signature. The synchronized aggregate signature has one drawback: all signers should share the same synchronizing information (such as a time clock or another shared value). Gentry and Ramzan [15] introduced the concept of synchronized aggregate signature. They proposed an identity-based synchronized aggregate signature scheme using bilinear groups, and they proved its security in the random oracle model. We note that identity-based aggregate signature (IBAS) is an ID-based scheme and thus relies on a trusted server knowing all private keys (i.e., its trust structure is different from that in regular PKI). However, it also has a notable advantage in that it is not required to retrieve the public keys of signers in the verification algorithm since an identity string plays the role of a public key (this lack of public key is indicated in our comparison table as public key of no size!). Recently, Ahn et al. [1] presented a public-key synchronized aggregate signature scheme without relying on random oracles.
The third type of aggregate signature is sequential aggregate signature (SAS), which enables each signer to aggregate his signature to a previously aggregated signature in a sequential order. The sequential aggregate signature has the obvious limitation of signers being ordered to aggregate their signatures in contrast to the full aggregate signature and the synchronized aggregate signature. However, it has an advantage in that it is not required to share synchronized information among signers in contrast to the synchronized aggregate signature, and many natural applications lead themselves to this setting. The concept of sequential aggregate signature was introduced by Lysyanskaya, Micali, Reyzin, and Shacham [29] , and they proposed a public-key sequential aggregate signature scheme using the certified trapdoor permutations in the random oracle model. Boldyreva et al. [7] presented an identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme in the random oracle model using an interactive assumption, but it was shown by Hwang et al. [20] that their construction is not secure. After that, Boldyreva et al. [8] proposed a new identity-based sequential aggregate signature by modifying their previous construction and proved its security in the generic group model. Recently, Gerbush et al. [16] showed that the modified IBAS scheme of Boldyreva et al. [8] is secure under static assumptions using the dual form signatures framework.
The first sequential aggregate signature scheme without random oracle idealization was proposed by Lu et al. [27, 28] . They converted the PKS scheme of Waters [34] to the PKAS scheme and proved its security under the well known CDH assumption. However, their scheme has a drawback since the number of group elements in a public key is proportional to the security parameter (for a security of 2 80 they need 160 elements, or about 80 elements in a larger group); so they left as an open question how to design a scheme with shorter public keys. Schröder proposed a PKAS scheme with short public keys relying on the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [33] ; however the scheme's security is proven under an interactive assumption (which, typically, is a relaxation used when designs based on static assumptions are hard to find). 2 Therefore, the construction of an SAS scheme with short public keys without relaxations such as random oracles or interactive assumptions was left as an open question.
Our Contributions
Challenged by the above question, the motivation of our research is to construct an efficient SAS scheme secure in the standard model (i.e., without employing assumptions such as random oracle or interactive assumptions as part of the proof) with short public keys (e.g., a constant number of group elements). To achieve this goal, we use the PKS scheme derived from the identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, which adopts the innovative dual system encryption techniques of Waters [26, 35] . That is, an IBE scheme is first converted to a PKS scheme by the clever observation of Naor [9] . The PKS schemes that adopt the dual system encryption techniques are the scheme of Waters [35] , which includes a random tag in a signature, and the scheme of Lewko and Waters [26] , which does not include a random tag in a signature. The scheme of Waters is not appropriate to aggregate signatures since the random tags in signatures cannot be compressed into a single value. The scheme of Lewko and Waters in composite order groups is easily converted to an aggregate signature scheme if an element in G p 3 is moved from a private key to a public key, but it is inefficient because of composite order groups. 3 2 Gerbush et al. [16] showed that a modified Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme in composite order groups is secure under static assumptions. However, it is unclear whether the construction of Schröder can be directly applied to this modified Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme. The reason is that aggregating G p 1 and G p 2 subgroups is hard and a private key element g 2, 3 ∈ G p 2 p 3 cannot be generated by the key generation algorithm of an aggregate signature scheme. Additionally, our work and findings are independent of the work of Gerbush et al. 3 We can safely move the element in G p 3 from a private key to a public key since it is always given in assumptions. Lewko obtained a prime order IBE scheme by translating the Lewko-Waters composite order IBE scheme using the dual pairing vector Static ROM = random oracle model, KOSK = certified-key model, IB = identity based λ = security parameter, k p , k f = the bit size of elements for pairing and factoring, l = the number of signers P = pairing computation, E = exponentiation, M = multiplication Therefore, we start the construction from the IBE scheme of Lewko and Waters (LW-IBE) [26] in the prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups. However, this LW-PKS scheme, which is directly derived from the LW-IBE scheme, is not easily converted to an SAS scheme (as far as we see). The reason is that we need a PKS scheme that supports multi-users and public re-randomization to construct an SAS scheme by using the randomness reuse technique of Lu et al. [27] , but the LW-PKS scheme does not support these two properties. Technically speaking, this directly converted LW-PKS scheme does not support multiusers and public re-randomization since group elements g, u, h ∈ G cannot be published in a public key. To resolve this problem, we devised two independent solutions. Our first solution for this problem is to randomize the verification algorithm of the LW-PKS scheme and publish g, u, h ∈ G in the public key. That is, the verification components are additionally multiplied byv,v ν 3 ,v −π to prevent the verification of invalid signatures. Our second solution for this problem is to randomize the group elements of the public key. That it, we publish gw
Here we first construct two PKS schemes in prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups that support multiusers and public re-randomization by applying our two solutions to the LW-PKS scheme, and we prove their security by using the dual system encryption technique. Next, we convert the modified PKS schemes to SAS schemes with short public keys by using the randomness reuse technique, and then we prove their security based on the traditional static assumptions without random oracles. Additionally, we present an efficient multi-signature scheme based on our modified PKS scheme. Table 1 gives the comparison of past aggregate signature schemes with ours.
spaces [25] . One may consider to construct an aggregate signature scheme using this IBE scheme. However, it is not easy to aggregate individual signatures since the dual orthonormal basis vectors of each users are randomly generated.
Additional Related Work
There are some works on aggregate signature schemes that allow signers to communicate with each other or schemes that compress only partial elements of a signature in the aggregate algorithm [2, 4, 12, 18] . Generally, communication resources of computer systems are very expensive compared with computation resources. Thus, it is preferred to perform several expensive computational operations rather than one single communication exchange. Additionally, a signature scheme with added communications does not correspond to a pure PKS scheme, but corresponds more to a multi-party protocol. In addition, PKS schemes that compress just partial elements of signatures cannot be considered aggregate signature schemes since the total size of signatures is still proportional to the number of signers.
Another research area related to aggregate signature is multi-signature [6, 21, 27] . Multi-signature is a special type of aggregate signature in which all signers generate signatures on the same message, and then any user can combine these signatures into a single signature. Aggregate message authentication code (AMAC) is the symmetric key analogue of aggregate signature: Katz and Lindell [22] introduced the concept of AMAC and showed that it is possible to construct an AMAC scheme based on any message authentication code scheme.
Preliminaries
In this section, we define asymmetric bilinear groups and introduce the complexity assumptions for our schemes. The description of LW-IBE and LW-PKS schemes is given in Appendix A.
Asymmetric Bilinear Groups
Let G,Ĝ and G T be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g andĝ be generators of G andĜ, respectively. The bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → G T has the following properties: ĝ) is a generator of G T .
We say that G,Ĝ, G T are bilinear groups with no efficiently computable isomorphisms if the group operations in G,Ĝ, and G T as well as the bilinear map e are all efficiently computable, but there are no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G andĜ.
Complexity Assumptions
We employ four assumptions in prime order bilinear groups. The SXDH and DBDH assumptions have been used extensively, while the LW1 and LW2 assumptions were introduced by Lewko and Waters [26] . The security model of PKS is defined as existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack (EUF-CMA), and this was formally defined by Goldwasser et al. [17] . In this security model, an adversary adaptively requests a polynomial number of signatures on messages through the signing oracle, and he finally outputs a forged signature on a message M * . If the message M * was not queried to the signing oracle and the forged signature is valid, then the adversary wins this game. The security of PKS is formally defined as follows: 
Definition 3.2 (Security

Construction
We construct PKS schemes with a short public key that will be augmented to support multi-users and public re-randomization. To construct a PKS scheme with a short public key, we may convert the LW-IBE scheme [26] in prime order groups to the LW-PKS scheme in prime order groups by using the transformation of Naor [9] . However, this directly converted LW-PKS scheme does not support multi-users and public rerandomization since it is necessary to publish additional public key components: Specifically, we need to publish an element g for multi-users and elements g, u, h for public re-randomization. Note thatĝ,û,ĥ are already in the public key, but g, u, h are not. One may try to publish g, u, h in the public key, but a technical difficulty arises in this case in that the simulator of the security proof can easily distinguish from the normal verification algorithm to the semi-functional one, without using an adversary. Thus the simulator of Lewko and Waters sets the CDH value into the elements g, u, h to prevent the simulator from creating these elements.
To solve this problem, we devise two independent solutions. The first solution allows a PKS scheme to safely publish elements g, u, h in the public key for multi-users and public re-randomization. The main idea is to additionally randomize the verification components usingv,v ν 3 ,v −π in the verification algorithm. If a valid signature is given in the verification algorithm, then the additionally added randomization elementsv,v ν 3 ,v −π are canceled. Otherwise, the added randomization components prevent the verification of an invalid signature. Therefore, the simulator of the security proof cannot detect the changes of the verification algorithm even if g, u, h are published, since the additional elementsv,v ν 3 ,v −π prevent the signature verification.
Our second solution for this problem is to publish randomized components gw 
Our PKS1 Scheme
Our first PKS scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
PKS1.KeyGen(1 λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G,Ĝ of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g, w ∈ G andĝ,v ∈Ĝ. Next, it chooses random exponents
It outputs a private key SK = α and a public key as
PKS1.Sign(M, SK):
This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ {0, 1} k where k < λ and a private key SK = α. It selects random exponents r, c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z p and outputs a signature as
PKS1.Verify(σ , M, PK):
This algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M ∈ {0, 1} k under a public key PK. It first chooses random exponents t, s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z p and computes verification components as
= Ω t . If this equation holds, then it outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
We note that the inner product of (φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 , 1) and (1, ν 1 , ν 2 , −τ) is zero since τ = φ 1 + ν 1 φ 2 + ν 2 φ 3 , and the inner product of (φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 , 1) and (0, 1, ν 3 , −π) is zero since π = φ 2 + ν 3 φ 3 . Using these facts, the correctness of PKS is easily obtained from the equation
Our PKS2 Scheme
Our second PKS scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
PKS2.KeyGen(1 λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G,Ĝ of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g, w ∈ G andĝ ∈Ĝ. Next, it selects random exponents ν, φ 1 , φ 2 ∈ Z p and sets τ = φ 1 + νφ 2 . It also selects random exponents α, x, y ∈ Z p and sets 
PKS2.Sign(M, SK):
This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ Z p and a private key SK = (α, g, u, h) with PK. It selects random exponents r, c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z p and outputs a signature as
PKS2.Verify(σ , M, PK):
This algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M ∈ Z p under a public key PK. It chooses a random exponent t ∈ Z p and computes verification components as
Next, it verifies that
We note that the inner product of (φ 1 , φ 2 , 1) and (1, ν, −τ) is zero since τ = φ 1 + νφ 2 . Using this fact, the correctness of PKS is easily obtained from the following equation
Security Analysis
We prove the security of our PKS schemes without random oracles under static assumptions. To prove the security, we use the dual system encryption technique of Lewko and Waters [26] . The dual system encryption technique was originally developed to prove the full-model security of IBE and its extensions, but it also can be used to prove the security of PKS by using the transformation of Naor [9] . Note that Gerbush et al. [16] developed the dual form signature technique that is a variation of the dual system encryption technique to prove the security of their PKS schemes. 
(λ ) where q is the maximum number of signature queries of A.
Proof. To use the dual system encryption technique of Lewko and Waters [26] , we first describe a semifunctional signing algorithm and a semi-functional verification algorithm. They are not used in a real system; rather, they are used in the security proof. When comparing our proof to that of Lewko and Waters, we employ a different assumption since we have published additional elements g, u, h used in aggregation (in fact, direct adaptation of the earlier technique will break the assumption and thus the proof). A crucial idea in our proof is that we have added elementsv,v ν 3 ,v −π in the public key that are used in randomization of the verification algorithm. In the security proof when moving from normal to semi-functional verification, it is the randomization elementsv,v ν 3 ,v −π that are expanded to the semi-functional space; this enables deriving semi-functional verification as part of the security proof under our assumption, without being affected by the publication of the additional public key elements used for aggregation.
For the semi-functional signing and verification, we set f = g y f ,f =ĝ y f where y f is a random exponent in Z p .
PKS1.SignSF.
The semi-functional signing algorithm first creates a normal signature using the private key.
Let (W ′ 1,1 , . . . ,W ′ 2,4 ) be the normal signature of a message M with random exponents r, c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z p . It selects random exponents s k , z k ∈ Z p and outputs a semi-functional signature as
PKS1.VerifySF. The semi-functional verification algorithm first creates normal verification components using the public key. Let (V ′ 1,1 , . . . ,V ′ 2,4 ) be the normal verification components with random exponents t, s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z p . It chooses random exponents s c , z c ∈ Z p and computes semi-functional verification components as
Note that if the semi-functional verification algorithm verifies a semi-functional signature, then the left part of the above verification equation contains an additional random element e( f ,f ) s k s c (z k −z c ) . If z k = z c , then the semi-functional verification algorithm succeeds. In this case, we say that the signature is nominally semi-functional.
The security proof uses a sequence of games G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 : The first game G 0 will be the original security game and the last game G 3 will be a game such that an adversary A has no advantage. Formally, the hybrid games are defined as follows:
Game G 0 . This game is the original security game. In this game, the signatures that are given to A are normal and the challenger use the normal verification algorithm Verify to check the validity of the forged signature of A.
Game G 1 . We first modify the original game to a new game G 1 . This game is almost identical to G 0 except that the challenger uses the semi-functional verification algorithm VerifySF to check the validity of the forged signature of A.
Game G 2 . Next, we change G 1 to a new game G 2 . This game is the same as the G 1 except that the signatures that are given to A will be semi-functional. At this moment, the signatures are semifunctional and the challenger uses the semi-functional verification algorithm VerifySF to check the validity of the forged signature. Suppose that A makes at most q signature queries. For the security proof, we define a sequence of hybrid games
normal signature is given to A for all j-th signature queries such that j > k, and a semi-functional signature is given to A for all j-th signature queries such that j ≤ k. It is obvious that G 1,q is equal to G 2 .
Game G 3 . Finally, we define a new game G 3 . This game differs from G 2 in that the challenger always rejects the forged signature of A. Therefore, the advantage of this game is zero since A cannot win this game.
For the security proof, we show the indistinguishability of each hybrid game. We informally describe the meaning of each indistinguishability as follows:
• Indistinguishability of G 0 and G 1 : This property shows that A cannot forge a semi-functional signature if it is only given normal signatures. That is, if A forges a semi-functional signature, then it can distinguish G 0 from G 1 .
• Indistinguishability of G 1 and G 2 : This property shows that the probability of A forging a normal signature is almost the same when the signatures given to the adversary are changed from a normal type to a semi-functional type. That is, if the probability of A forging a normal signature is different in G 1 and G 2 , then A can distinguish the two games.
• Indistinguishability of G 2 and G 3 : This property shows that A cannot forge a normal signature if it is only given semi-functional signatures. That is, if A forges a normal signature, then it can distinguish G 2 from G 3 .
The security (unforgeability) of our PKS scheme follows from a hybrid argument. We first consider an adversary A attacking our PKS scheme in the original security game G 0 . By the indistinguishability of G 0 and G 1 , we have that A can forge a normal signature with a non-negligible ε probability, but it can forge a semi-functional signature with only a negligible probability. Now we should show that the ε probability of A forging a normal signature is also negligible. By the indistinguishability of G 1 and G 2 , we have that the ε probability of A forging a normal signature is almost the same when the signatures given to A are changed from a normal type to a semi-functional type. Finally, by the indistinguishability of G 2 and G 3 , we have that A can forge a normal signature with only a negligible probability. Summing up, we obtain that the probability of A forging a semi-functional signature is negligible (from the indistinguishability of G 0 and G 1 ) and the probability of A forging a normal signature is also negligible (from the indistinguishability of G 2 and G 3 ).
Let Adv
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From the following three Lemmas, we prove that it is hard for A to distinguish G i−1 from G i under the given assumptions. Therefore, we have that
This completes our proof.
Lemma 3.4. If the SXDH assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between G 0 and G 1 with non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B 1 such that Adv
Proof. Before proving this lemma, we introduce the parallel-SXDH assumption as follows: Let (p, G,Ĝ, G T , e) be a description of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p. Let k,k be generators of G,Ĝ respectively. The assumption is stated as following: given a challenge tuple
It is easy to prove by simple hybrid arguments that if there exists an adversary that breaks the parallel-SXDH assumption, then it can break the SXDH assumption. Alternatively, we can tightly prove the reduction using the random self-reducibility of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G 0 and G 1 with non-negligible advantage. Simulator B 1 that solves the parallel-SXDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
. Then B 1 that interacts with A is described as follows: 3 and publishes a public key PK as
It sets a private key SK = α. Additionally, it sets f = k,f =k for the semi-functional signature and verification. A adaptively requests a signature for a message M. 
= Ω t . If this equation holds, then it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish this proof, we show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We first show that the distribution using
is the same as G 0 . The public key is correctly distributed since the random blinding values y g , y w , y v are used. The signatures is correctly distributed since it uses the signing algorithm. The verification components are correctly distributed as
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D,
is the same as G 1 . We only consider the distribution of the verification components since T is only used in the verification components. The difference between T 0 = (A 0 1 , A 0 2 ) and 
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G 1,k−1 and G 1,k with non-negligible advantage. A simulator B 2 that solves the LW2 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
that interacts with A is described as follows:
Additionally, it sets f = k,f =k for the semi-functional signature and verification. A adaptively requests a signature for a message M. If this is a j-th signature query, then B 2 handles this query as follows:
• Case j < k : It creates a semi-functional signature by calling PKS1.SignSF since it knows the tuple ( f ν 1 ν 3 −ν 2 , f −ν 3 , f , 1) for the semi-functional signature.
• Case j = k : It selects random exponents r ′ , c ′ 1 , c ′ 2 ∈ Z p and creates a signature by implicitly setting
• Case j > k : It creates a normal signature by calling PKS1.Sign since it knows α of the private key.
Note that x, y are not required.
Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ * = (W To finish the proof, we should show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We first show that the distribution of the simulation using D, T 0 = k bc is the same as G 1,k−1 . The public key is correctly distributed since the random blinding values y u , y h , y w , y v are used. The k-th signature is correctly distributed as
The semi-functional verification components are correctly distributed as 
then the distribution of the k-th signature is the same as G 1,k except that the k-th signature is nominally semi-functional. Finally, we show that the adversary cannot distinguish the nominally semi-functional signature from the semi-functional signature. The main idea of this is that the adversary cannot request a signature for the forgery message M * in the security model. Suppose there exists an unbounded adversary, then the adversary can gather z k = AM + B from the k-th signature and z c = AM * + B from the forged signature. It is easy to show that z k and z c look random to the unbounded adversary since f (M) = AM + B is a pair-wise independent function and A, B are information theoretically hidden to the adversary. This completes our proof. 
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguish G 2 from G 3 with non-negligible advantage. A simulator B 3 that solves the DBDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
that interacts with A is described as follows: B 3 first chooses random exponents ν 1 , ν 3 , φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 ∈ Z p and sets π = φ 2 + ν 3 φ 3 . It selects random exponents y g , x, y, y w , y v ∈ Z p and sets g = k y g , u = g x , h = g y , w 1 = k y w φ 1 , w 2 = k y w φ 2 , w 3 = k y w φ 3 , w = k y w ,ĝ =k y g ,û =ĝ x ,ĥ =ĝ y ,v =k y v . It implicitly sets ν 2 = a, τ = φ 1 + ν 1 φ 2 + aφ 3 , α = ab and publishes a public key PK as
Additionally, it sets f = k,f =k for the semi-functional signature and semi-functional verification. A adaptively requests a signature for a message M. To respond to this query, B 3 selects random exponents r, c 1 , c 2 , s k , z ′ k ∈ Z p and creates a semi-functional signature by implicitly setting
The simulator can only create a semi-functional signature since s k , z k enables the cancellation of k ab . Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ * = (W 
g . If this equation holds, then it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation using D, T = e(k,k) abc is the same as G 2 . The public key is correctly distributed since the random blinding values y g , y w , y v are used. The semi-functional signature is correctly distributed as
The semi-functional verification components are correctly distributed as
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D, T 1 = e(k,k) d is almost the same as G 3 . It is obvious that the signature verification for the forged signature always fails if T 1 = e(k,k) d is used except with 1/p probability since d is a random value in Z p . This completes our proof. 
Analysis of PKS2
Proof. Before proving the security, we first define two additional algorithms for semi-functional types. For the semi-functionality, we set f = g y f ,f =ĝ y f where y f is a random exponent in Z p .
PKS2.SignSF.
Let (W ′ 1,1 , . . . ,W ′ 2,3 ) be the normal signature of a message M with random exponents r, c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z p . It selects random exponents s k , z k ∈ Z p and outputs a semi-functional signature as
PKS2.VerifySF. The semi-functional verification algorithm first creates normal verification components using the public key. Let (V ′ 1,1 , . . . ,V ′ 2,3 ) be the normal verification components with a random exponent t ∈ Z p . It chooses random exponents s c , z c ∈ Z p and computes semi-functional verification components as The security proof uses a sequence of games G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 . The definition of these games is the same as that of Theorem 3.3. From the following three lemmas, we prove that it is hard for A to distinguish G i−1 from G i under the given assumptions. Therefore, we have that
Lemma 3.8. If the LW1 assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between G 0 and G 1 with non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B 1 such that Adv
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G 0 and G 1 with non-negligible advantage. A simulator B 1 that solves the LW1 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple 
It implicitly sets 
Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ * = (W * 1,1 , . . . ,W * 2,3 ) on a message M * from A. To verify the forged signature, B 1 first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Z p and computes verification components by implicitly setting t = c as
To finish this proof, we show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We first show that the distribution using D, T 0 =k ab 2 c is the same as G 0 . The public key is correctly distributed as
The simulator cannot create g, u, h since k b 2 is not given in the assumption, but it can create gw since c g , c u , c h can be used to cancel out k b 2 . The signature is correctly distributed as
It can create a normal signature since c 1 , c 2 enable the cancellation of k b 2 , but it cannot create a semifunctional signature since k a is not given. The verification components are correctly distributed as
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D, T 1 =k ab 2 c+d is the same as G 1 . We only consider the distribution of the verification components since T is only used in the verification components. The difference between T 0 and T 1 is that 
and T where T = T 0 = k bc or T = T 1 = k bc+d . Then B 2 that interacts with A is described as follows: B 2 first selects random exponents ν, y τ , A, B, α, y u , y h , y w ∈ Z p . It computes 
• Case j < k : It creates a semi-functional signature by calling PKS2.SignSF since it knows the tuple ( f −ν , f , 1) for the semi-functional signature.
• Case j = k : It selects random exponents r ′ , c ′ 1 , c ′ 2 ∈ Z p and creates a signature by implicitly setting r = −c + r ′ , c 1 = c(AM + B)/y w + c ′ 1 , c 2 = c/y w + c ′ 2 as
• Case j > k : It creates a normal signature by calling PKS2.Sign since it knows the private key.
Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ * = (W * 1,1 , . . . ,W * 2,3 ) on a message M * . To verify the forged signature, B 2 first chooses a random exponent t ′ ∈ Z p and computes semi-functional verification components by implicitly setting t = bx + t ′ , s c = −a 2 x, z c = AM * + B as To finish the proof, we should show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We first show that the distribution of the simulation using D, T 0 = k bc is the same as G 1,k−1 . The public key is correctly distributed since the random blinding values y u , y h , y w are used. The k-th signature is correctly distributed as
The simulator can create the semi-functional verification components with only fixed z c = AM * + B since s c , s c enable the cancellation ofk a 2 bx . Even though it uses the fixed z c , the distribution of z c is correct since A, B are information theoretically hidden to A. We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D, T 1 = k bc+d is the same as G 1,k . We only consider the distribution of the k-th signature since T is only used in the k-th signature. The only difference between T 0 and T 1 is that T 1 additionally has k d . The signature components
then the distribution of the k-th signature is the same as G 1,k except that the k-th signature is nominally semi-functional. Finally, we show that A cannot distinguish the nominally semi-functional signature from the semifunctional signature. The main idea of this is that A cannot request a signature for the forgery message M * in the security model. Suppose there exists an unbounded adversary, then he can gather z k = AM + B from the k-th signature and z c = AM * + B from the forged signature. It is easy to show that z k , z c look random to the unbounded adversary since f (M) = AM + B is a pair-wise independent function and A, B are information theoretically hidden to the adversary. This completes our proof. 
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguish G 2 from G 3 with non-negligible advantage. A simulator B 3 that solves the DBDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D = ((p, G,Ĝ, G T , e),  k, k a , k b , k c ,k,k a ,k b ,k c ) and T where T = T 0 = e(k,k) abc or T = T 1 = e(k,k) d . Then B 3 that interacts with A is described as follows: B 3 first chooses random exponents φ 1 , φ 2 , y g , x, y ∈ Z p and a random element w ∈ G. It computes g = k y g , u = g x , h = g y ,ĝ =k y g ,û =ĝ x ,ĥ =ĝ y , w 1 = w φ 1 , w 2 = w φ 2 . It implicitly sets ν = a, τ = φ 1 + aφ 2 , α = ab and publishes a public key PK by selecting random values c g , c u , c 
It can only create a semi-functional signature since s k , z k enables the cancellation of k ab . Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ * = (W 
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation using D, T = e(k,k) abc is the same as G 2 . The public key is correctly distributed since the random values y g , x, y, c g , c u , c h are used. The semi-functional signature is correctly distributed as
The simulator can only create a semi-functional signature since z k = by g /s k + z ′ k enables the cancellation of k ab . The semi-functional verification components are correctly distributed as
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D, T 1 = e(k,k) d is almost the same as G 3 . It is obvious that the signature verification for the forged signature always fails if T 1 = e(k,k) d is used except with 1/p probability since d is a random value in Z p . This completes our proof.
Sequential Aggregate Signature
In this section, we propose two SAS schemes with short public keys and prove their security based on that of our PKS schemes.
Definitions
The concept of SAS was introduced by Lysyanskaya et al. [29] . In SAS, all signers first generate public keys and private keys, and then publishes their public keys. To generate a sequential aggregate signature, a signer may receive an aggregate-so-far from a previous signer, and creates a new aggregate signature by adding his signature to the aggregate-so-far in sequential order. After that, the signer may send the aggregate signature to a next signer. A verifier can check the validity of the aggregate signature by using the pubic keys of all signers in the aggregate signature. An SAS scheme is formally defined as follows: A trivial SAS scheme can be constructed from a PKS scheme by concatenating each signer's signature in sequential order, but the size of aggregate signature is proportional to the size of signers. Therefore, a non-trivial SAS scheme should satisfy the signature compactness property that requires the size of aggregate signature to be independent of the size of signers.
KeyGen(PP). The key generation algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP, and outputs a public key PK and a private key SK.
AggSign(AS ′ , M, PK, M, SK). The aggregate signing algorithm takes as input an aggregate-so-far AS
The security model of SAS was defined by Lysyanskaya et al. [29] , but we follow the security model of Lu et al. [27] that requires for an adversary to register the key-pairs of other signers except the target signer, namely the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) setting or the proof of knowledge (POK) setting. In this security model, an adversary first given the public key of a target signer. After that, the adversary adaptively requests a certification for a public key by registering the key-pair of other signer, and he adaptively requests a sequential aggregate signature by providing a previous aggregate signature to the signing oracle. Finally, the adversary outputs a forged sequential aggregate signature on messages under public keys. If the forged sequential signature satisfies the conditions of the security model, then the adversary wins the security game. The security model of SAS is formally defined as follows: Definition 4.2 (Security). The security notion of existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack is defined in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Setup: C first initializes a certification list CL as empty. Next, it runs Setup to obtain public parameters PP and KeyGen to obtain a key pair (PK, SK), and gives PK to A. 
Certification Query: A adaptively requests the certification of a public key by providing a key pair (PK, SK
Construction
To construct an SAS scheme from a PKS scheme, the PKS scheme should support multi-users by sharing some elements among all signers and the randomness of signatures should be sequentially aggregated to a single value. We can employ the randomness reuse technique of Lu et al. [27] to aggregate the randomness of signatures. To apply the randomness reuse technique, we should re-randomize the aggregate signature to prevent a forgery attack. Thus we build on the PKS schemes of the previous section that support multi-users and public re-randomization to construct SAS schemes.
Our SAS1 Scheme
Our first SAS scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows: SAS1.Setup(1 λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G,Ĝ of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g, w ∈ G andĝ,v ∈Ĝ. Next, it chooses random exponents
It publishes public parameters as
SAS1.KeyGen(PP):
This algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents α, x, y ∈ Z p and computes
It outputs a private key SK = (α, x, y) and a public key as
SAS1.AggSign(AS
This algorithm takes as input an aggregate-so-far
, 1} k where k < λ , a private key SK = (α, x, y) with PK = (u, h, . . . , Ω) and PP. It first checks the validity of AS ′ by calling AggVerify(AS ′ , M ′ , PK ′ ). If AS ′ is not valid, then it halts. If the public key PK of SK does already exist in PK ′ , then it halts. Next, it creates temporal aggregate components by using the randomness of the previous aggregate-so-far as
Finally, it selects random exponents r, c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z p for re-randomization and outputs an aggregate signature as
SAS1.AggVerify(AS, M, PK):
This algorithm takes as input a sequential aggregate signature AS on messages M = (M 1 , . . . , M l ) under public keys PK = (PK 1 , . . . , PK l ) where PK i = (u i , h i , . . . , Ω i ). It first checks that any public key does not appear twice in PK and that any public key in PK has been certified. If these checks fail, then it outputs 0. If l = 0, then it outputs 1 if S 1 = S 2 = 1, 0 otherwise. It chooses random exponents t, s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z p and computes verification components as 
, S 2,4 = wc 2 .
Our SAS2 Scheme
Our second SAS scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
SAS2.Setup(1 λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G,Ĝ of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g, w ∈ G andĝ ∈Ĝ. Next, it selects random exponents ν, φ 1 , φ 2 ∈ Z p and sets τ = φ 1 + νφ 2 , w 1 = w φ 1 , w 2 = w φ 2 . It publishes public parameters by selecting a random value c g ∈ Z p as
.
SAS2.KeyGen(PP):
This algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents α, x, y ∈ Z p and setsû =ĝ x ,ĥ =ĝ y . It outputs a private key SK = (α, x, y) and a public key by selecting If the public key PK of SK does already exist in PK ′ , then it halts. Next, it creates temporal aggregate components by using the randomness of the previous aggregate-so-far as
SAS2.AggSign(AS
Finally it selects random exponents r, c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z p for re-randomization and outputs an aggregate signature as 1 , . . . , Ω i ). It first checks that any public key does not appear twice in PK and that any public key in PK has been certified. If these checks fail, then it outputs 0. If l = 0, then it outputs 1 if S 1,1 = · · · = S 2,3 = 1, 0 otherwise. It chooses a random exponent t ∈ Z p and computes verification components as 
then the aggregate signature is correctly distributed as Proof. Our overall proof strategy for this part follows Lu et al. [27] and adapts it to our setting. The proof uses two properties: the fact that the aggregated signature result is independent of the order of aggregation, and the fact that the simulator of the SAS system possesses the private keys of all but the target PKS.
Security Analysis
Suppose there exists an adversary A that forges the above SAS1 scheme with non-negligible advantage ε. A simulator B that forges the PKS1 scheme is first given: a challenge public key PK PKS = ((p, G,Ĝ, G T , e), g, u, h, w 1 , . . . , w,ĝ, . . . ,ĝ −τ ,û, . . . ,û −τ ,ĥ, . . . ,ĥ −τ ,v,v ν 3 ,v −π , Ω). Then B that interacts with A is described as follows: B first constructs PP = ((p, G,Ĝ, G T , e), g, w 1 , . . . , w,ĝ, . . . ,ĝ −τ ,v,v ν 3 ,v −π ) and PK * = (u, h,û, . . . ,û −τ ,ĥ, . . . ,ĥ −τ , Ω = e(g,ĝ) α ) from PK PKS . Next, it initializes a certification list CL as an empty one and gives PP and PK * to A. A may adaptively requests certification queries or sequential aggregate signature queries. If A requests the certification of a public key by providing a public key PK i = (u i , h i , . . . , Ω i ) and its private key SK i = (α i , x i , y i ), then B checks the private key and adds the key pair (PK i , SK i ) to CL. If A requests a sequential aggregate signature by providing an aggregate-so-far AS ′ on messages M ′ = (M 1 , . . . , M l−1 ) under public keys PK ′ = (PK 1 , . . . , PK l−1 ), and a message M to sign under the challenge private key of PK * , then B proceeds the aggregate signature query as follows:
1. It first checks that the signature AS ′ is valid and that each public key in PK ′ exits in CL.
2. It queries its signing oracle that simulates PKS1.Sign on the message M for the challenge public key PK * and obtains a signature σ .
3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, it constructs an aggregate signature on message M i using SAS1.AggSign since it knows the private key that corresponds to PK i . The result signature is an aggregate signature for messages M ′ ||M under public keys PK ′ ||PK * since this scheme does not check the order of aggregation. It gives the result signature AS to A.
Finally, A outputs a forged aggregate signature AS * = (S * 1,1 , . . . , S * 2,4 ) on messages M * = (M 1 , . . . , M l ) under public keys PK * = (PK 1 , . . . , PK l ) for some l. Without loss of generality, we assume that PK 1 = PK * . B proceeds as follows:
1. B first checks the validity of AS * by calling SAS1.AggVerify. Additionally, the forged signature should not be trivial: the challenge public key PK * must be in PK * , and the message M 1 must not be queried by A to the signature query oracle.
For each 2
* , and it retrieves the private key SK i = (α i , x i , y i ) of PK i from CL. It then computes
) as a non-trivial forgery of the PKS scheme since it did not make a signing query on M 1 .
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. It is obvious that the public parameters and the public key are correctly distributed. The sequential aggregate signatures is correctly distributed since this scheme does not check the order of aggregation. Finally, we can show that the result signature σ = (W 1,1 , . . . ,W 2,4 ) of the simulator is a valid signature for the PKS1 scheme on the message M 1 under the public key PK * since it satisfies the following equation: 1. It first checks that the signature AS ′ is valid and that each public key in PK ′ exits in CL.
2. It queries its signing oracle that simulates PKS2.Sign on the message M for the challenge public key PK * and obtains a signature σ .
3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, it constructs an aggregate signature on message M i using SAS2.AggSign since it knows the private key that corresponds to PK i . The result signature is an aggregate signature for messages M ′ ||M under public keys PK ′ ||PK * since this scheme does not check the order of aggregation. It gives the result signature AS to A.
Finally, A outputs a forged aggregate signature AS * = (S * 1,1 , . . . , S * 2,3 ) on messages M * = (M 1 , . . . , M l ) under public keys PK * = (PK 1 , . . . , PK l ) for some l. Without loss of generality, we assume that PK 1 = PK * . B proceeds as follows:
1. B first checks the validity of AS * by using SAS2.AggVerify. Additionally, the forged signature should not be trivial: the challenge public key PK * must be in PK * , and the message M 1 must not be queried by A to the signature query oracle. 
The public parameters and the public key are correctly distributed, and the sequential aggregate signatures are also correctly distributed since this scheme does not check the order of aggregation. The result signature σ = (W 1,1 , . . . ,W 2,3 ) of the simulator is a valid PKS signature on the message M 1 under the public key PK * since it satisfies the following equation:
Discussions
Multiple Messages. The SAS schemes of this paper only allow a signer to sign once in the aggregate algorithm. To support multiple signing per one signer, we can use the method of Lu et al. [27] . The basic idea of Lu et al. is to apply a collision resistant hash function H to a message M before performing the signing algorithm. If a signer wants to add a signature on a message M 2 into the aggregate signature, he first removes his previous signature on H(M 1 ) from the aggregate signature using his private key, and then he adds the new signature on the H(M 1 ||M 2 ) to the aggregate signature.
Multi-Signature
In this section, we propose an efficient multi-signature (MS) scheme with short public parameters and prove its security without random oracles.
Definitions
Multi-Signature (MS) can be regarded as a special kind of PKAS in which different signatures generated by different signers on the same message are combined as a short multi-signature. Thus MS consists of four algorithms of PKS and additional two algorithms Combine and MultiVerify for combining a multisignature and verifying a multi-signature. In MS, each signer generates a public key and a private key, and he can generate an individual signature on a message by using his private key. To generate a multi-signature, 
Construction
To construct an MS scheme with short public parameters, we may use our PKS schemes that support multiusers and public re-randomization. To aggregate the randomness of signatures, we cannot use the technique of Lu et al. [27] since the randomness should be freely aggregated in MS. Instead we aggregate the randomness of signatures by using the fact that each signer generates a signature on the same message in MS. That is, if group elements u, h that are related to message hashing are shared among all signers, then the randomness of each signer can be easily aggregated since the random exponent in a public key and the randomness of a signature are placed in different positions. Thus our two PKS schemes can be used to build MS schemes since g, u, h in PKS1 or gw 1 in PKS2 are published in a public key. Note that it is not required for a signer to publicly re-randomize a multi-signature since each signer selects an independent random value.
To reduce the size of multi-signatures, we use our PKS2 scheme for this MS scheme. Our MS scheme based on the PKS2 scheme is described as follows:
MS.Verify(σ , M, PK):
This algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M under a public key PK.
It chooses a random exponent t ∈ Z p and computes verification components as 
MS.MultVerify(MS, M, PK):
This algorithm takes as input a multi-signature MS on a message M under public keys PK = (PK 1 , . . . , PK l ) where PK i = Ω i . It chooses a random exponent t ∈ Z p and computes verification components as
Next, it verifies that ∏ ,ĝ) and PK * = Ω from PK PKS . Next, it initialize a certification list CL as an empty one and gives PP and PK * to A. A may adaptively request certification queries or signature queries. If A requests the certification of a public key by providing a public key PK i = Ω i and its private key SK i = α i , then B checks the key pair and adds (PK i , SK i ) to CL. If A requests a signature by providing a message M to sign under the challenge private key of PK * , then B queries its signing oracle that simulates PKS2.Sign on the message M for the challenge public key PK * , and gives the signature to A. Finally, A outputs a forged multi-signature MS * = (S * 1,1 , . . . , S * 2,3 ) on a message M * under public keys PK * = (PK 1 , . . . , PK l ) for some l. Without loss of generality, we assume that PK 1 = PK * . B proceeds as follows:
1. B first check the validity of MS * by calling MS.MultVerify. Additionally, the forged signature should not be trivial: the challenge public key PK * must be in PK * , and the message M must not be queried by A to the signing oracle. 3. It outputs σ = (W 1,1 , . . . ,W 2,3 ) as a non-trivial forgery of the PKS scheme since it did not make a signing query on M 1 .
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. It is obvious that the public parameters, the public key, and the signatures are correctly distributed. Next we show that the output signature σ = (W 1,1 , . . . ,W 2,3 ) of the simulator is a valid signature for the PKS2 scheme on the message M 1 under the public key PK * since it satisfies the following equation
Discussions
Removing the Proof of Knowledge. In our MS scheme, an adversary should prove that he knows the private key of other signer by using a zero-knowledge proof system. Ristenpart and Yilek [32] showed that some MS schemes can be proven in the proof of possession (POP) setting instead of the POK setting. Our MS scheme also can be proven in the POP setting by using their technique. That is, if our MS scheme is incorporated with a POP scheme that uses a different hash function, and the adversary submits a signature on the private key of other signer as the proof of possession, then the security of our scheme is also achieved. In the security proof, a simulator cannot extract the private key element g α from the signature of the POP scheme, but he can extract other values g α w c ′ 1 , w c ′ 2 , w c ′ and these values are enough for the security proof.
Conclusion
In this paper, we first proposed two PKS schemes with short public keys that support multi-users and public re-randomization based on the LW-IBE scheme. Next, we proposed two SAS schemes with short public keys without random oracles and with no relaxation of assumptions (i.e., employing neither random oracles nor interactive assumptions) based on our two PKS schemes. The proposed SAS schemes are the first of this kind that have short (a constant number of group elements) size public keys and a constant number of pairing operations per message in the verification algorithm. We also proposed an MS scheme with short public parameters based on our PKS scheme and proved its security without random oracles.
There are many interesting open problems. The first one is to construct an SAS scheme with short public keys that is secure under standard assumptions without random oracles. A possible approach is to build an SAS scheme based on the practical PKS scheme of Böhl et al. [5] that is secure under the standard assumption. The second one is to build an SAS scheme with short public keys that supports lazy verification and has the constant size of aggregate signatures. Brogle et al. [12] proposed an SAS scheme with lazy verification, but the size of aggregate signatures in their SAS scheme is not constant.
PKS.Verify(σ , M, PK):
This algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M ∈ {0, 1} k under a public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Z p and computes verification components as We can safely move the elements w 1 , w 2 , w from the private key to the public key since these elements are always constructed in the security proof of the LW-IBE scheme. However, this LW-PKS scheme does not support multi-user setting and public re-randomization since the elements g, u, h are not given in the public key.
